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Abstract This paper analyzes the relationship between religious market product 
variety and church membership. We find that denominational variety is negatively 
associated with the total level of church membership in U.S. counties. This result 
appears to contradict the standard religious product variety model. Our data are 
consistent with a more general view of markets that incorporates the cost to 
consumers of product variety. Where product variety has significant costs, an 
increase in variety may reduce total market penetration. The paper suggests market 
characteristics that might give rise to this situation, characteristics present in the 
religion market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In ordinary markets, an increase in the variety of products results in an increase 
in total market sales, ceteris paribus. A number of researchers have begun 
analyzing the "religion" market treating churches or denominations as firms 
operating in ordinary markets. Does a greater variety of denominational choice 
in a religious market lead to larger total church membership? Are religious 
markets ordinary? 
This paper suggests that religious markets are not ordinary markets. A 
consumer in a religion market faces significant costs if religions with incompat­
ible doctrines are in the market. If the cost to a consumer of inconsistent doctrines 
exceeds the benefit of denominational variety, regions with greater denomina­
tional variety will have lower total church membership. As an important 
extension, consumers in some non-religious markets may also experience 
substantial costs of product variety. Not all markets are ordinary. 
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We first outline the standard economic model of product variety and its 
application to religious markets. The standard theory is a natural extension of 
Lancaster's (1975, 1979) analysis of product variety. The theory is plausible for 
religious markets. However, the empirical evidence from religious markets 
supporting the theory is not completely convincing. 
In the subsequent section, we present an alternative view that more accurately 
describes the unique character of religious markets. This view emphasizes the role 
of uncertainty and commitment costs in selecting a religion. The fourth section 
examines data on the number of church adherents by U.S. county. We find that 
denominational concentration is positively associated with the total level of 
church membership. The final section summarizes results and suggests applica­
tions to other markets. 
THE STANDARD PRODUCT VARIETY MODEL 
The role of product variety in markets was first comprehensively explored by 
Kelvin Lancaster (1975, 1979). In Lancaster's formulation, people have differing 
preferences for product characteristics within a product family or industry. Given 
some degree of economies of scale, a monopoly protected by entry restrictions 
produces a limited variety of products and limits total industry output. If entry is 
permitted, both product variety and total output in the industry increase. 
Removing restrictions on entry increases product variety as new firms enter the 
market. Since consumers have a greater choice of products at lower prices, total 
sales in the industry increase. The natural extension of Lancaster's work is the 
idea that as product variety in an industry increases, total market sales also 
increase, holding price and other factors constant. 
That religion might be amenable to this sort of market analysis is not a new 
notion. A model of religious market structure first appears in Adam Smith's The 
Wealth of Nations (1979 [1776]). Smith treats churches as firms participating in 
a market for religion. As such, churches are motivated and challenged in the same 
way as ordinary firms. Smith contrasts an established church-a state-funded and 
protected monopoly-with disestablished competing churches supported by 
member donations. Because they survive on voluntary contributions, successful 
disestablished churches are compelled to behave in a way that is attractive to 
members. Smith then predicts disestablished competing churches will have 
greater total membership than an established church. Posner (1987) resurrects this 
argument and draws related conclusions. Recent research by Hamberg and 
Pettersen (1994) tests and confirms Smith's prediction using contemporary 
Swedish data. Stark and Iannaccone (1994) use European data to support the 
theory. Although they do not quite use Lancaster's theory, these researchers 
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demonstrate clearly the value of economic analysis in explaining aspects of 
religious market conduct. In fact, a substantial body of work applies economic 
models to religious activity other than just market structure and conduct (for one 
survey, see Iannaccone and Hull 1991). 
Iannaccone (1991) makes the first explicit application of a Lancaster-like 
product variety model to religious markets. He presents survey data from a 
number of Western European countries showing that the degree of religious 
commitment and membership among Protestants increases as the concentration 
ratio of denominations in a country falls. Although Iannaccone appeals to Smith's 
comparison of established and non-established churches, the data analysis is 
consistent with the Lancaster product variety approach. Work by Stark, Finke, and 
Iannaccone (1995) further supports the product variety theory using mid-1800s 
data from England and Wales. Zaleski and Zech's (1995) data on member 
contributions to 179 U.S. congregations in three Protestant denominations and the 
Catholic church also appeals to the product variety model. There thus seems to 
be substantial support for a Lancaster-like product variety model applied to 
religious markets. 
This was the starting point for our research. Having been exposed to the 
standard model, we were sympathetic to its implications. We planned a 
straightforward application of the model to a massive survey conducted by the 
Glenmary Research Center which compiles 1980 membership data for one 
hundred eleven Judeo-Christian denominations in each of the roughly 3,100 
counties in the United States. Here apparently was an ideal opportunity to 
reconfirm the standard product variety prediction. The data are ideally suited. The 
United States religious market is arguably the most competitive and has a long 
constitutionally based tradition of independence from government involvement. 
As such, potential problems inherent in comparing religions across countries with 
different cultures and government policies are eliminated. The county level data 
allows comparisons based on local markets, an appealing scale for individual 
denominational choice. 
The results of our preliminary analysis were frustrating. Instead of a positive 
relationship between denominational variety and total membership, the relation­
ship was significantly negative. Believing that our result must simply be due to 
variables omitted from the regression equation, we incorporated various plausible 
demographic variables from Census Bureau data. While the explanatory value of 
the regression equations improved, the key result remained contrary to the 
standard theory. In the United States, denominational variety is negatively 
associated with total church membership at the county level. 
A more careful reexamination of the standard product variety model and 
the evidence extant supporting its application to religious markets proved 
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enlightening. First, as mentioned earlier, two distinct models and lines of 
evidence emerged. The first follows Smith's insight about established and 
disestablished churches. Here the data strongly support the theory, Hamberg and 
Pettersen's (1994) and Stark and Iannaccone's (1994) work being examples. 
These results are important but not applicable to the United States, whose 
churches have long been disestablished. 
The second model and strand of evidence concerning the relationship between 
denominational variety and total church membership is relevant to the U.S. 
situation and seems to show a positive relationship between total membership and 
denominational variety. However, closer examination of this research often 
reveals significant unresolved issues. Iannaccone, for example, acknowledges 
problems with his European religion data and results arising from the high 
concentration and high church membership in the predominately Catholic nations 
in Europe. This fact contradicts the product variety prediction. So serious is the 
problem that Iannaccone treats Catholics separately in his regressions. Further, 
Catholics respond in the regression results in a manner inconsistent with the 
standard prediction. Iannaccone's analysis also does not address the difference 
between established church monopolies (mainly Scandinavian Protestant coun­
tries) and highly concentrated religious markets that do not have an established 
church (several Catholic countries). Subsequent research by Chaves and Cann 
(1992) addresses these issues and shows that government support and regulation 
of religion better explains the variation in total church membership in Western 
European nations than does religious market concentration (although the index of 
government support and regulation is somewhat arbitrarily constructed). Impor­
tantly, Chaves and Cann's result is consistent with Smith's original prediction that 
state support is a key predictor of total membership. 
Similarly, Stark, Finke, and Iannaccone in their England and Wales data must 
also exclude Catholics from their measure of denominational variety in order to 
achieve the standard product variety model's predicted result. Zaleski and Zech 
run separate regressions and report different results for Catholic and Protestant 
churches. Note also that Zaleski and Zech's independent variable is church 
member contributions. Contributions are a valuable measure of member commit­
ment, but do not measure market penetration. 
Further investigation outside the economics literature revealed other research­
ers who had tested versions of the religious market model. An exchange between 
Brealt (l989a, 1989b) and Finke and Stark (1989) in the American Sociological 
Review is an illustration. Using the Glenmary data, albeit without additional 
demographic variables, Brealt finds a significant negative relationship between 
denominational variety and church membership, contradicting Finke and Stark's 
(1988) analysis of 1906 U.S. census data for 150 cities. Brealt notes that Finke 
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and Stark obtain their result by treating Catholics separately. Finke and Stark 
reply in part that Brealt's result is invalid because it does not control for Catholics 
(and Mormons). The debate in the sociology literature includes other papers as 
well and addresses a variety of issues not applicable to our work here, including 
whether or not religion should even be treated as a market and whether there is 
a trend toward secularization in Europe and the United States. See, for example, 
Bruce (1992), Chaves (1995), Finke and Stark (1992), and Stark (1992, 1994). 
The key conclusion from a review of the existing evidence supporting the 
standard market model is that the standard model's predictions about behavior in 
religious markets obtain only when those observations which do not support the 
theory are excluded or treated separately. The early statistical results that so 
puzzled us were not anomalous at all. Of course, the authors who choose this 
approach present arguments for doing so. On grounds of methodology, however, 
we could not. It seemed to us that the theory needed to be comprehensive enough 
to embrace all of the data. 
Of necessity, we returned to the economics literature on product variety. 
Surprisingly, in a review of the literature we could find no formal prediction of 
a positive relationship between product variety and total market penetration. 
Lancaster and others deal with the differences between monopoly and competi­
tion in product variety or with the question of whether competitive markets 
provide the optimal degree of product variety. No implications about market 
penetration emerge from these analyses. 
To summarize, Adam Smith's application of economic theory to the religion 
market is both plausible and strongly supported empirically. Competing dis­
established churches have greater total membership than an established monopoly 
church. Lancaster's product variety model is also plausible, but the empirical 
evidence is consistent with the theory only when Catholics (the largest single 
denomination) are treated separately. Finally, the commonly accepted notion that 
product variety and total market penetration are positively related is not explicitly 
supported by a formal theory. 
ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
People are also getting mighty tired of the endlessly escalating, extremely confusing 
war of the pain relievers. At one time, years ago, there was just aspirin, which was 
basically for headaches; now, there are dozens of products, every single one of 
which seems to be telling you that, not only is it more EFFECTIVE than the other 
ones, but also the other ones could cause a variety of harmful side effects such as 
death. It seems safer to just live with the headache. 
(Barry 1997) 
5 
REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY 
Modeling a church as a firm is a useful approach that yields a number of 
testable implications. However, even as a firm, a church produces a unique set of 
products in a unique manner, as we show in other work (Hull and Bold 1989). 
Modeling aspects of church products that are unique can in tum generate 
nonobvious implications about religious markets. 
An individual church offers some mix of attributes defining doctrine and other 
church products given the attribute mix offered by other churches. Market entry 
occurs so long as expected revenue exceeds expected opportunity cost. Some 
economies of scale in production or fixed costs of entry are present so that the 
competitive equilibrium number of churches is finite. 
A church might enter a market even if doing so reduces total market sales-a 
possibility that we explain below. Such entry can occur so long as average 
revenue per church exceeds average cost per church, and this can happen even 
when industry total revenue is falling (i.e., when industry marginal church 
revenue is negative). Competitive entry into formerly monopolized markets, 
congested roads, and the overexploitation of common-property resources such as 
fisheries are examples of situations with similar characteristics. 
Declining total market sales can result from an important special characteristic 
of religious markets ignored by Smith and most subsequent researchers. For 
religion, church members may benefit from reducing the variety of products. 
Lancaster acknowledges this possibility by recognizing that his product variety 
model "abstracts from such problems as search and information costs, and 
disutilities of uncertainty or consumer confusion in the face of variety" (1975: 
567). In sufficient strength, such a tendency would result in competitive forces 
reducing total market output. This possibility is also recognized by Scherer and 
Ross: 
Variety is not always a good thing. Wholly apart from the cost savings attainable 
through longer production runs, there are cases in which standardization serves 
consumers better than diversity. The adoption of common technical standards for 
records and compact discs, so that any product can be played on any manufacturer's 
audio equipment, is one example. 
(Scherer and Ross 1990: 607) 
Perhaps the standard product variety model needs to be revised and extended 
to incorporate explicitly the potential costs to the consumer of product variety, 
especially in religious markets. Certainly consumers gain utility from a particular 
mix of church attributes (doctrine). Importantly, and unlike Lancaster, consumer 
cost might also be affected by the presence of other churches and their doctrines. 
The increase in cost as the number of competing churches increases can have 
several causes. We suggest that there are at least four ways by which product 
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variety in religious markets increases consumer costs: 
Uncertainty: Conflicting doctrinal messages tend to reduce the plausibility of 
any particular doctrine. For example, all claims about the afterlife are less 
plausible when members are aware that different churches have different claims, 
especially since these claims can be mutually exclusive. One church's doctrine 
might permit or even encourage behavior that is prohibited by another church. As 
the number of denominations increases so does the uncertainty about the claims 
of all of them. 
Commitment: The decision to adopt a particular religion requires significant 
investment in religious "human capital" (Iannaccone 1990), making a future 
change in religious affiliation particularly costly. This commitment cost increases 
the loss associated with an incorrect decision. Further, an incorrect decision might 
be very costly indeed, involving eternal damnation and forgone eternal bliss long 
after the "product" is purchased. 
Search: Increased product variety in religions may also increase a consumer's 
search costs if the individual believes that there are significant negative 
consequences for selecting the "wrong" religion. For example, if the consumer 
believes that eternal salvation depends on selecting the single right or best 
religion, the consumer will devote more care, time, and resources to the search 
process. A possible consequence is that the consumer may select none of the 
available religions for fear of making the wrong choice and instead decide on an 
independent "personal" religion, delay making a religious choice, or choose no 
religion at all. This approach to search differs from the general thrust of the 
substantial literature on search in which an increase in the number of firms does 
not harm consumers. The seminal work is by Stigler (1961). Contemporary 
contributions include Chou and Talmain (1993), Fershtman and Fishman (1992), 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988), and Wilde (1992). According to this literature, an 
individual can always choose a minimum search, ignoring additional available 
options. Additional options may cause an individual to engage in additional 
search, but such search cannot make the individual less likely to purchase a 
product at all. The preceding applies, however, only so long as there is no cost 
to making an incorrect decision. In the case of religion, the usual search model 
result may not apply because the cost of an incorrect decision can be substantial. 
Some information about religions might be available at zero cost given that 
people often gain information incidentally from friends, schools, newspapers, and 
as a result of marketing efforts by the churches themselves. Part of this 
information may have a negative cast to it as when one denomination portrays 
another unfavorably. In some cases one church may condemn another and 
threaten sanctions against individuals who might consider other religions. As an 
example of the latter, official Catholic doctrine held until recently that all 
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Protestants were automatically condemned to hell (doubtless causing some young 
Catholics to raise the question, "What is a Protestant?"). The belief that Jews 
sacrificed Christian children was widespread in Medieval Europe (Cohn 1967). 
Regardless of its accuracy, such low-cost information highlights the presence and 
conflicting doctrines of other churches. Further, the early stage of a costly search 
might include gathering low-cost information about the number of alternatives 
available for searching. Alternatively, as a costly search proceeds, an individual 
might receive increasingly contradictory information. The point is that informa­
tion about the number of alternatives is available to individuals and the 
information affects individuals' budget constraints. 
Membership: Church members may benefit in various ways from an increased 
number of members. Association with other people as well as the positive aspects 
of communal worship are examples. This latter is of obvious importance and is 
termed "participatory crowding" by Iannaccone (1992). A closely related concept 
is "network externality" where the value of a product depends on the number of 
people using the product or on the number of complementary products in the 
market. A presentation of the latter is in Katz and Shapiro (1992). To the extent 
that an increase in the number of churches reduces average church membership 
and interpersonal association, a cost is imposed on existing members as the 
number of churches increases. 
The key observation here is that the nature of product variety may be different 
in the religion market than in ordinary markets. In most markets, variety occurs 
over product characteristics where uncertainty or commitment costs are insignif­
icant. Shoes, for example, are available from a number of manufacturers in an 
incredible variety of shapes and colors. The decision to purchase a particular pair 
of shoes, however, involves little uncertainty. A consumer can see the color of the 
shoes and try on the shoes before purchase. Any remaining uncertainty is 
minimized because the shoes customarily can be returned after purchase. Further, 
purchase of a given pair of shoes does not preclude purchase of other pairs-in 
the present or the future-nor does it increase the cost of purchasing other pairs. 
In this type of market, consumers see little or no cost to product variety, and we 
expect that the usual Lancaster-type prediction should obtain. An increase in 
product variety will increase total market penetration. By contrast, in the market 
for religion the presence of negative as well as positive aspects of product variety 
implies that there is a potential for the Lancaster-type prediction to be reversed. 
Here an increase in product variety may reduce total market penetration. 
Our model retains Lancaster's view of consumer behavior. A consumer 
chooses to become a member of a church at a threshold level of utility where the 
benefit of membership exceeds the cost. If so, the person becomes a member of 
the "closest" church in terms of the person's preferred doctrinal mix. The 
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threshold is different for different people, so that there is a probability or 
proportion function of people who join at given distances from the most desired 
doctrinal mix. As they are closer to a given doctrinal mix, a larger fraction of 
people join. 
Again following Lancaster, individuals prefer additional denominations 
because additional denominations mean a consumer's chosen denomination 
moves "closer" to the consumer's ideal denomination type. Alternatively, the 
number of denominations might affect utility indirectly through the bundle of 
church goods offered. Product characteristic spaces are filled as new denomina­
tions enter. This positive relationship between the number of denominations and 
utility is consistent with the usual market models where consumers prefer greater 
product variety. 
Our model extends Lancaster's approach by allowing the number of denomi­
nations to affect a consumer's budget constraint. In particular, as the number of 
denominations increases, uncertainty, commitment, and search costs increase. A 
consumer is aware of these alternative denominations because we assume that 
some level of information is available at zero or very low cost. 
For individuals who are indifferent between being members and non-members, 
the net utility from membership equals the net utility from non-membership. If 
the cost to marginal church members of an additional denomination exceeds the 
benefit of an additional denomination, an increase in the number of denomina­
tions will cause marginal members to become non-members and so reduce the 
total number of church members. The model cannot determine a priori whether 
an increase in the number of denominations necessarily increases or decreases 
total church membership, and we would not expect the model to do so. 
Nevertheless, the costs of product variety in the religion market might indeed be 
substantial, possibly substantial enough to overcome the benefits of denomina­
tional variety. 
As is clear from the earlier discussion, the cost of product variety in religious 
markets is greater than in any number of "ordinary" markets. Religions 
commonly require of members significant long-term commitments of time and 
money. These commitments are lost if a person changes religion. Furthermore, a 
correct decision may imply eternal reward and an incorrect decision eternal 
punishment, extremes in outcomes not present in ordinary markets and again 
resulting in high uncertainty costs. Also, these afterlife outcomes only occur well 
after the decision to adopt a religion is made. The decision to choose a 
denomination is irreversible after some point. If there is any market where the net 
effect of product variety is negative, it is the religion market. 
While the number of denominations is exogenous to an individual, the 
equilibrium denominational variety in an unregulated market is influenced by the 
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underlying distribution of individual preferences, population density, and other 
factors including church cost functions. If individuals in a market have very 
similar preferences, denominational variety will be low, even without external 
market restrictions. We largely abstract from the issue of the distribution of 
preferences in our model, as well as the issue of which particular set of 
denominations is chosen within a community. Nevertheless, for a given distribu­
tion of preferences, as population in an area increases, the market can support 
more churches and religious market concentration will fall. If at the same time, 
the costs of increased variety outweigh the benefits, then total membership or total 
membership as a share of population will decline. 
The preceding also suggests that there may be a tendency for significant 
religious market concentration at the local level where the total population is 
small. New denominations can enter a local market only when the population is 
great enough to allow the new denomination to succeed in the face of a decline 
in overall membership due to the entry of the new denomination. 
The cost of product variety serves to protect current producers from the threat 
of new entry by making new entry more difficult in a manner similar to the way 
economies of scale makes subsequent entry more difficult. As long as the costs 
of local denominational variety are more important to the consumer than national 
denominational variety, market concentration at the local level can be high even 
if national concentration is low. A similar phenomenon occurs in markets for 
newspapers, which tend to be locally or regionally concentrated but uncon­
centrated using national aggregate market shares. 
A final insight is that the average level of religious commitment by church 
members can rise even if an increase in the number of denominations causes a fall 
in total membership. The level of utility (commitment) varies across members. As 
an increase in the number of denominations reduces membership in a given 
church, it is the marginal members who leave the church. Therefore, the 
remaining members are more committed, on average. Zaleski and Zech's (1995) 
regressions show that member contributions as a percentage of income increase 
as the number of members in a given church falls. Such a result is consistent with 
our model and could apply even with falling levels of total membership. 
DATA AND TESTS 
In this section we discuss the data and structure of the regressions used to examine 
the relationship between religious affiliation and denominational concentration. 
Data used are for virtually all of the 3,137 counties in the United States. Church 
membership data for 111 Judeo-Christian denominations come from Churches 
and Church Membership in the U.S., 1980, compiled by Glenmary Research 
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Center. Other data come from the County and City Data Book (1983 edition). 
The dependent variable, the level of religious affiliation for each county, is 
based on the reported number of "adherents" for all denominations per thousand 
people in the county. The primary independent variable of interest is a standard 
Herfindahl index of denominational concentration, the sum of the squared market 
shares of denominations in the county. If the standard product variety model is 
correct, the coefficient for this variable should be positive because the model 
maintains that there is a negative relation between concentration and market 
penetration. If the costs of variety are greater than the benefits, the coefficient for 
the concentration variable will be positive. Also of interest is the effect of 
population density on market penetration. The alternative model predicts a 
negative relationship between these two variables since, as the population within 
a market area increases, more denominations should enter and the membership 
proportion should decline, other things equal. 
We include additional demographic variables to control for other factors that 
will affect the proportion of the population affiliated with a religion. Community 
stability should positively affect church membership. This is proxied with the 
percentage of the population that are new residents in the last five years, the 
inverse of stability. As people age, they might become more concerned about the 
afterlife, might have made a decision about a religion, and might have more time 
to devote to religion, suggesting a positive relationship between the median age 
and church membership. Included also are the unemployment rate, income, and 
education level. These factors have a generally recognized association with the 
level of church membership. Regressions with a variety of other independent 
variables had no material effect on the key results. 
The first column of Table 1 summarizes the basic regression result. The 
positive coefficient for the concentration variable (HERFINDAHL) is clearly at 
odds with the standard product variety model and consistent with the alternative 
model presented here. Also consistent with the alternative model, population 
density is negatively related to church membership. For the other variables, 
community (in)stability (NEW RESIDENTS), unemployment, and income are 
negatively related to church membership, while age and education are positively 
related. Although not shown in Table 1, we also estimate the equations replacing 
the Herfindahl index with a simple count of denominations. The results were 
again consistent with the alternative model. The number of denominations (a 
measure of market diversity) was negatively related to total church membership. 
A possible criticism of using the entire sample of counties is that low church 
membership may be mainly a function of the unique character of urban areas not 
captured by our measure of population density. If so, the Herfindahl index would 
simply be a proxy for urban population. We therefore repeated the basic 
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TABLE 1: Church Market Structure Regressions 
Urban Rural Non-Black 
All Counties Counties Counties Counties 
constant 6381 12403 4724 7162 
HERFINDAHL 1814 1456 1781 3176 
POP DENSITY -0.051 -o.027b -9.74 -1.351 a 
NEW RESIDENTS -73.9 -63.3 -97.9 -106 
UNEMPLOYED -194 -307 -148 -185 
AGE 58.0 -39.6b 90.5 30.2 
INCOME -0.224 -0.232 -O.017b 0.010b 
EDUCATION 19.0 -19.0b 14.7a 15.4 
R2 adjusted 0.300 0.395 0.318 0.402 
n 3099 337 1181 1498 




Dependent variable is ADHERENTS
 
All coefficients are statistically significant at 0.01 except where noted.
 
a Significant at 0.05.
 
b Not statistically significant.
 
regressions with urban and rural subsets of the data. The urban subset is for 
counties with 75 percent or more of the population defined by the census bureau 
as urban. The rural subset is for counties with 25 percent or less of the population 
defined as urban. The coefficient for the Herfindahl index remains significantly 
positive. The population density variable coefficients lose statistical significance 
for the urban counties. This is not surprising, since the urban counties already 
have high population density, representing roughly the top 10 percent of counties 
in terms of population density (n = 337). Coefficients for the new residents and 
unemployment variables remain negative and significant. Coefficients for the 
other independent variables are not consistently significant. 
A final concern is that, as Stark (1987) shows, the Glenmary data underreport 
membership in predominantly African-American denominations. To address this 
potential problem, we estimate equations for a subset of the data that includes 
only counties where the proportion of African Americans in the population is less 
than or equal to 1 percent. The Herfindahl index coefficient remains significantly 
positive and, interestingly, is even larger than for the other regressions. As with 
the urban and rural regressions, coefficients for the new residents and unemploy­
ment variables remain negative and significant. Coefficients for the other 
independent variables are not consistently significant. Examination of the data 
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showed no compelling evidence of heteroscedasticity. Nevertheless, we ran 
regressions using weighted least squares. The key results were unaffected and are 
not shown here. Regression results with nonlinear specifications were also not 
materially different. 
CONCLUSION 
Using U.S. data for one hundred eleven Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant 
denominations in roughly 3,100 counties we find significant evidence that 
denominational concentration and religious affiliation are positively related. This 
result holds for a variety of subgroups of the population. We suggest that the 
explanation for this finding is that there is a negative effect of denominational 
variety on total religious affiliation. In particular, conflicting doctrines cause an 
increase in uncertainty, commitment, search, and membership costs. Most 
importantly, increased doctrinal variety leads to a diminished strength of belief 
that any single doctrine is correct. Further, the regression results show that 
increases in population result in lower membership as a proportion of population. 
Although this result is less strongly supported with the data, it is consistent with 
the model. 
Our results stand in contrast to those of Iannaccone, Finke, and Stark by 
showing a negative relationship between denominational concentration and the 
total number of religious adherents. What explains this apparent contradiction 
between our results and those of other researchers? 
We suggest the contradiction is due first to confusion between Smith's insight 
about established and disestablished churches and with the standard product 
variety model. Second, the standard product variety model proves to be too 
narrow to apply to markets, like religion, where product variety can have 
significant costs. Referring to the first issue, our discussion shows that some 
empirical results reported by other authors, Iannaccone (1991) in particular, 
appeal to the product variety theory but are in fact comparing established state­
supported churches to competing disestablished churches. Here the empirical 
results are consistent with Hamberg and Pettersen (1994) and Adam Smith's 
analysis of established and competing disestablished churches where competing 
disestablished churches have greater total membership than an established church 
due to the pressure on competing disestablished churches to attract members and 
donations. No contradiction of our model is implied because the theories address 
different situations. 
Referring to the second issue, note again that researchers presenting evidence 
of a Lancaster-like religious product variety model omit or treat Catholics 
separately. In other words, other researchers assert that the usual product variety 
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result occurs among Protestant denominations but not between Protestants and 
Catholics. By the same argument, Jewish denominations ought to be treated 
separately as well. The least degree of product variety occurs among Protestant 
denominations. It is possible that the benefits of this limited degree of variety 
outweigh the costs of the variety. Thus, among Protestant denominations, it is 
perhaps reasonable to expect the usual product variety result. 
Addressing this issue, we repeated our regressions with the dependent variable 
being the membership share of the population attributable to Protestant denomi­
nations. The Herfindahl index was recalculated to include Protestant denomina­
tional shares only. Table 2 summarizes these regressions. 
The results are nearly identical to those in Table 1 which include Jewish 
denominations and Catholics. While one might suspect that the standard product 
variety market model applies within the Protestant submarket, in the United States 
it does not. The costs of variety among the Protestant denominations apparently 
overwhelm any benefits from variety among them. 
We should emphasize, however, that restricting the sample to Protestants is not 
appropriate in our model, regardless of the fact that the restriction does not change 
the statistical results. Moreover, treating Protestants as a separate and distinct 
market because individuals are more likely to substitute between Protestant 
TABLE 2: Church Market Structure Regressions 
Urban Rural Non-Black 
All Counties Counties Counties Counties 
constant -579a -283a 382a -305a 
HERFINDAHL 1811 3992 693.5 2748 
(PR) 
POP DENSITY -0.066 -0.011 a -6.67 -2.84 
NEW RESIDENTS -63.9 -31.7 -94.2 -95.6 
UNEMPLOYED -109 -71.4 -84.4 -114 
AGE 89.1 -11.8a 81.9 64.9 
INCOME -0.35 -0.263 -O.002a 0.076a 
EDUCATION 77.5 -67.5 63.2 71.6 
R2 adjusted 0.322 0.329 0.348 0.405 
n 3094 337 1176 1493 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000P 
Notes: 
Includes Protestant denominations 
Dependent variable is PROTESTANT ADHERENTS 
All coefficients are statistically significant at 0.01 except where noted. 
a Not statistically significant. 
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denominations than between Protestant and Jewish denominations and the 
Catholic church is questionable and arbitrary even within the context of the 
standard product variety model. It is as if Protestant religions offer variety, but 
non-Protestant religions offer too much variety. 
However, in terms of the costs of religious product variety, it is clearly 
appropriate to include non-Protestants, not because they are viewed as viable 
substitute choices, but because these religions can increase the costs of product 
variety. In particular, they represent conflicting doctrines that might reduce the 
plausibility of any given doctrine. People who would never consider becoming 
Catholic might face increased uncertainty about their Protestant denomination in 
the presence of a strong local Catholic church. The argument applies as well to 
the idea of using a separate variable for Catholics in the regressions. The model 
appropriately should aggregate all denominations. In fact, it is unfortunate that we 
have no data for the small fraction of Americans who are members of non-Judeo­
Christian religions. Nevertheless, to the extent possible, our statistical analysis 
accounts for the full range of product variety in the U.S. religion market. 
But is religion unique? Might not other markets face similar costs of product 
variety? One interesting insight in thinking about variety in the religion market 
is that doing so highlights the degree of product similarity within most markets. 
Our attention as economists often tends to focus on the enormous variety of 
products available in modem competitive markets, not on the forces that 
minimize differences. Much of the impetus for minimizing differences comes 
from the familiar pressures of competition on producers to find ever better 
solutions to the problem of meeting consumer wants. This pressure, combined 
with the options and limitations imposed by existing technology, frequently 
guides producers to the same or similar solutions. 
Other reductions in variety are the result of more deliberate decisions. In 
particular, product standardization is so widespread as to be nearly pervasive in 
our economy. Standardization often involves eliminating variety across some set 
of product attributes so that products from competing producers can be used 
conveniently with complementary products. Household appliances, for example, 
are manufactured by a number of competing firms in any number of styles. 
However, they all come in a small number of matching colors, standardized 
across competing manufacturers and across different products (such as stoves, 
refrigerators, counter tops, and toasters). Similarly, no two lamp models look 
alike, but they all use the same outlet plug and one of a few standardized bulb 
socket types. It is fair to say that firms in most well-established markets recognize 
the benefits of product standardization along some product dimensions and take 
action to capture these benefits. Several government and private standard-setting 
organizations such as the U.S. Bureau of Standards, ANSI, and Underwriter's 
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Laboratory exist in large part to foster standardization. Other examples abound. 
The point cannot be emphasized too much. Most of what we treat as product 
variety is variety within a standardized environment. Much attention is given to 
the variety. Relatively little mention is given to the standardization. 
The issue of standardization emerges under a different guise in the network 
externality literature. Here researchers attempt to model a market where 
consumers gain when other consumers purchase the same product or where a 
given product is more valuable when complementary products are also available. 
In both of these cases, competitive markets are shown to be capable of producing 
suboptimal results (Church and Gandal 1992; Katz and Shapiro 1992). That is, 
competitive markets can provide excessive product variety when network 
externalities are important. 
Further, firms in less well-established markets can be seen trying to create 
standards, including de facto standards. The market for personal computers was 
growing modestly until IBM introduced the PC, a model that was easily imitated 
and had the ability to use standardized components and accessories. Subsequent 
competition between manufacturers caused prices to plummet and the market to 
expand dramatically, but the competition occurred within the standardized PC 
design. The failure of non-PC Apple Macintosh and Apple II to maintain market 
share is consistent here. Few contemporary computer users are even aware of the 
early non-standardized computers such as Tandy, Wang, Amiga, and various 
CP/M systems. 
While differences in religions are apparent, so too is the considerable degree 
to which religions are similar. This is particularly true of mainstream Protestant 
denominations, most of which now teach tolerance toward other denominations. 
The worldwide historic success of the Catholic church may be due to its 
willingness to allow fairly substantial local variation on a standardized doctrine. 
Periodic ecumenical movements in the U.S. can be interpreted as efforts at 
standardization. The Ten Commandments, shared by Judeo-Christians, are a clear 
instance of attribute similarity. 
Despite these efforts, however, the religion market is unlikely ever to achieve the 
sort of standardization that occurs in other competitive markets. As discussed, the 
essential characteristics ofreligion involve substantial uncertainty and commitment 
costs. Efforts by ecumenicists may have reduced these costs (among mainstream 
Protestants) but no amount of effort has or likely will reduce these costs sufficiently 
to make the religion market an ordinary market. The regressions in Table 2 reinforce 
this assertion within the Protestant submarket in the United States. 
We conclude, therefore, that not all markets are ordinary, and that the religion 
market is least likely of all to be ordinary. In ordinary markets, competition occurs 
within a framework where key product characteristics are uniform across 
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manufacturers or where such attribute uniformity is unimportant. In these 
markets, increases in product variety result in increases in total market 
penetration, the usual result. In other markets, the religion market being an 
outstanding example, key product characteristics are not identical and product 
variety increases costs, especially uncertainty, commitment, and search costs to 
such an extent that competitive markets cause a reduction in total market 
penetration. 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
ADHERENTS: Adherents per 10,000 population in county. 
PROTESTANT 
ADHERENTS: Protestant adherents per 10,000 population in county. 
HERFINDAHL: Herfindahl index of denomination concentration. 
HERFINDAHL(PR): Herfindahl index of denomination concentration using 
only Protestant denominations. 
POP DENSITY: Population per square mile in county. 
NEW RESIDENTS: Percent of population who moved into county in 
previous five years. 
UNEMPLOYED: County unemployment rate. 
AGE: Median age of county population. 
INCOME: Median per capita income of county population. 
EDUCATION: Percent of county population age 25 and older with high 
school education. 
Sources: Glenmary Research Center (1982), U. S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census (1983). 
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